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Summary
Reflecting on the May 2019 European Parliament elections, the EU demo-
cratic institutions are in need of efficiently responding to the discrepancies be-
tween public agendas and policy-making (as shown in the Macedonia naming 
dispute), and the threatening dynamics of authoritarian populism, as well as 
to unpredictable reactions from diverse groups and citizens, especially from 
the neglected, excluded and marginal ones. These citizens cannot handle com-
plexity and react by voting for protest candidates/movements and supporting 
radical, yet oversimplified and inadequate, solutions to complex problems. 
Given the potentiality of crisis cascades and that an over-standardized “one 
size fits all” approach does not work anymore, the EU policy-making experts 
should arguably turn their analytic attention to existing drivers of political 
destabilisation by adopting new knowledge bases and sources. This pertains 
to a fresh theoretical understanding of nonlinear sociopolitical phenomena 
(from populist reactions of any kind to social media behaviours), that is, a 
deeper, complexity-friendly approach drawn from new scientific advance-
ments and coupled with innovative policy designs, aimed to rebalance the 
system and to defend the European project against further failures.
Keywords: Populism, Social Media, Policy-Making, Cultural Backlash, Com-
plexity, European Union
Introduction
On 14 December 2005, Professor Lee Carroll Bollinger, the President of New 
York’s prestigious Columbia University, gave an inspirational speech where he 
called our analytic attention to a series of novel and global challenges (quoted in 
Lettieri, 2016: 1):
Tsekeris, C., Demertzis, N., Inclusion of People in Decision-Making: The New Challenges
61
The forces affecting societies around the world and creating a global community 
are powerful and novel. The spread of global market systems, the rise of (and re-
sistance to) various forms of democracy, the emergence of extraordinary opportu-
nities for increased communication and of an increasingly global culture, and the 
actions of governments and nongovernmental organizations are all reshaping our 
world and our sense of responsibility for it and, in the process, raising profound 
questions. These questions call for the kinds of analyses and understandings that 
academic institutions are uniquely capable of providing. Too many policy failures 
are fundamentally failures of knowledge...
In this evolving and accelerating setting, the European Union (EU) needs to re-
flexively situate and theorise itself within a highly networked, hyperconnected and 
globalised world environment (of 7.7 billion people) in which the strong multiple 
interdependencies between technological, ecological, economic, social and politi-
cal subsystems and risks are becoming ever more frequent (and fast) and difficult to 
predict and to control (Helbing, 2013; WEF, 2018 and 2019).1 This is vital for the 
very future of the EU, which is under stress and must rather urgently invest in ho-
listic and meaningful sustainability, political, economic, social and environmental, 
beyond the current elusive and ever-threatening crisis (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 
2018). It is also in line with articulating an agreed change of paradigm of the Eu-
ropean and international policies on development cooperation, as well as a global 
and interdisciplinary language (or vocabulary) strategically aimed to achieve the 
so-called Agenda 2030 and the seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs), 
as set up by the United Nations in 2015 (in specific, 17 SDGs and 169 associated 
targets).2
However, such theorisation is arguably incompatible with the old, received 
or conventional approaches to policy modelling, which regularly underestimate 
the profound role of uncertainty and “nonlinear” social and economic dynamics, 
as well as of the complex interaction between public choices and individual deci-
sion-making, thus showing large limitations in terms of efficacy (Squazzoni, 2014; 
1 But although authoritative expert predictions (in science, in economics, in politics) are comi-
cally bad, reliable insight and foresight may indeed be possible through interdisciplinary open-
ness, generalist thinking, hypothesis testing, and continuous experimentation and learning (Ep-
stein, 2019).
2 The EU has recently outlined three possible scenarios on how best to progress on the com-
prehensive and global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). First, an overarching EU SDGs 
strategy to guide all actions by the European Union and Member States. Second, continued 
mainstreaming of the SDGs in all relevant EU policies by the Commission, but not enforcing 
Member States’ action. Third, putting enhanced focus on external action while consolidating 
current sustainability ambition at EU level. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/
reflection-paper-towards-sustainable-europe-2030_en (accessed 31 January 2019).
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Eppel and Rhodes, 2018). In addition, steering governance mechanisms are outda-
ted and conventional approaches are almost unable to adequately account not only 
for the increased societal and political complexity, but also for the growing discre-
pancy between governmental decisions and people’s feelings and orientations, as 
vividly demonstrated in the case of the Macedonia naming dispute.
In the light of these critical considerations, this article argues that for the EU 
policy-making experts (including both political decision-makers, academics, and 
think tankers) the main task to successfully cope with the emergent challenges of 
the contemporary speedy, complex, multipolar and multiconceptual world largely 
depends on the strategic capacity to generate fresh understanding of how individu-
als and groups think, decide, interact and react to constant changes and disruptive 
discontinuities. Such understanding pertains to the cross-fertilisation between dif-
ferent cultures, disciplines and research areas, “from computer and complexity sci-
ence to law and economics, from sociology to cognitive and behavioral sciences. In 
the same perspective, it will be necessary to foster an issue-oriented and interdisci-
plinary approach to research overcoming a cultural resistance that still appears far 
from being broken down” (Lettieri, 2016: 13; see also Lane et al., 2009; Helbing, 
2015; Wiesner et al., 2018). 
New conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools, therefore, will allow 
new practices for dynamic and innovative policy design, able to contain the hidden 
factors, the complex generative processes and the underlying drivers that constantly 
feed social unrest and political destabilisation in Europe and beyond. Due to space 
constraints, our arguments here should only be considered as exploratory.
1. The Case of the Macedonia Naming Dispute
Despite the large efforts made by FYROM’s pro-Western Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, 
as well as the strong Western support to him (for instance, US Defense Secretary 
James Mattis, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz visited Skopje, while US President 
Donald Trump sent a written message), the 30 September 2018 name-change refe-
rendum results did not bring the much expected happy-end solution to the so-called 
Macedonia naming dispute. Turnout was much below the required 50 per cent thresh-
old, arguably signifying that the “North Macedonia” proposal (linked with the healthy 
hope of joining the European Union and NATO) contradicts the way in which most 
citizens in FYROM perceive themselves, their cultural self-identity and national nar-
ratives (see Zeri, Tsekeris and Tsekeris, 2018; Daskalovski, 2017; Koneska, 2019).3
3 On 11 January 2019, however, the country’s Parliament completed the required legal imple-
mentation of the Prespa Agreement by approving the constitutional changes for renaming the 
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In crisis-ridden Greece, the restart of the diplomatic negotiations in early Feb-
ruary 2018 with FYROM to settle the naming dispute under the auspices of the 
United Nations and the European Union, within the official framework of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy in the Balkans, triggered a sudden and emotionally charged 
resistance of a large part of the Greek society against the use of the name “Macedo-
nia” (including its derivatives). As recent polls4 have demonstrated, the majority of 
people in Greece (68.3 per cent) are strongly against the Prespa Agreement.
According to an extensive quantitative survey (Armakolas and Siakas, 2018) 
on Greek public attitudes towards the naming dispute, with nationwide coverage 
and multi-stage stratified sampling, a large majority of participants (71.5 per cent) 
totally reject any reference to the term “Macedonia” as a part of any future solution, 
while only 22.5 per cent responded that they could accept a composite name that 
would include the term “Macedonia”. Most importantly, this recent survey vividly 
shows that the “non-accommodative/rejectionist” or “un-comprising” camp (i.e. no 
reference to the term “Macedonia” or a derivative of that word) has had a sharp in-
crease in the last two years.
It is evident that it is the Greek radical social imaginary, to use Cornelius Cas-
toriadis’s (1991) famous philosophical terminology,5 as well as its permanent deep 
attachment to classical antiquity (Zeri, Tsekeris and Tsekeris, 2018; Sofos, 2010), 
rather than the press, the mass media, the online networks, the digital platforms, or 
the actual structure of the political party system, that substantially affects and ac-
tively shapes the public opinion against FYROM’s name claims.6
In the meantime, new generations became voters in both Greece and FYROM, 
who have no substantive access to the near and distant past, as well as to actual his-
torical experiences concerning the disputed issue. Evidently, collective memory is 
in decay (Candia et al., 2018) and the attraction of the young to political extremes 
and radical anti-system parties has grown slowly but steadily over time (see Mounk, 
2018). To a large degree, these generations are also against any compromise (like the 
“North Macedonia” proposal) to the decades-old row between Athens and Skopje.
country to North Macedonia with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, while on 25 January 2019, 
Greece’s Parliament also approved the Prespa agreement with 153 votes in favor and 146 votes 
against.
4 See http://en.protothema.gr/new-poll-683-say-no-to-the-tsipras-zaev-agreement/ (accessed 1 Ap-
ril 2019).
5 Cf. the relational notion of “social unconscious” (Dalal, 2001; Weinberg, 2007; Brown, 2001; 
Hopper and Weinberg, 2017; Hopper, 2001, 2003).
6 Understanding how different Greek locales perceive their complex relationship with Balkan 
history, culture and heritage, is arguably crucial to the systematic study of politics and everyday 
life in contemporary Greece (Knight, 2018: 195).
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Interestingly, the collective belief in the inherent superiority of the Greek cul-
ture and national identity is strong. Although 77 per cent of Greeks say representa-
tive democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, when it comes to 
public attitudes on national identity, religion, and the place of religious minorities, 
Greeks hold more nationalist and less accepting or tolerant views than do Western 
Europeans, according to a recent Pew Research Center (PRC) analysis of surveys 
in 34 countries across the continent.7 In the same line, according to the inaugural 
World Values Survey (WVS-7) for Greece, one in five respondents does not want a 
neighbour who follows another religion, while 21 per cent agreed with the idea that 
when science and religion clash, the latter is always right.8
This more or less signifies the deep prevalence of the introverted, traditional 
“underdog culture” over the extrovert, modern “reformist culture” within the Greek 
society (Diamandouros, 1994; cf. Demertzis, 1997; Panagiotopoulos and Vamva-
kas, 2013), as well as the unconscious insecurities of the Greek people (concerning 
their identity and social life), which are ascribed in an imaginary way to foreign-
ers (Lipowatz, 2014; see also Herzfeld, 1987). In addition, Greece’s linking social 
capital has always been very low, as a result of “the low levels of trust, of a pro-
liferation of free-riding, of the low levels of cooperation and reciprocity, of high 
levels of corruption and high levels of tolerance toward that corruption... An insti-
tutionally immature society that combines institutional sclerosis and institutional 
atrophy” (Hatzis, 2018: 843). In such context, crony capitalism and rent-seeking 
networks clearly prevail over civil society (egalitarian) networks, something that 
further feeds the aforementioned “non-accommodative/rejectionist” or “un-com-
prising” camp. At the analytical level, both kinds of networks are complex and, 
therefore, their systematic study requires interpretive emphasis on local context (not 
necessarily restricted to “real space”) and relational interaction processes.
2. Drivers of Destabilisation
Yet, more generally, not much analytic attention has been paid to the sharp and in-
creasing discrepancy between public agendas and policy-making, between ordinary 
people’s tendencies and governments’ strategic targets and orientations (including 
EU government).9 Arguably, both the European and national policy-making autho-
7 See http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/31/greek-attitudes-toward-religion-minori-
ties-align-more-with-central-and-eastern-europe-than-west/ (accessed 1 February 2019).
8 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSNewsShow.jsp?ID=388 (accessed 1 March 2019).
9 The actual gap between the electorates and the political and cultural elites obviously continues to 
widen within Europe, particularly pertaining to the fragile balance between what ought to remain 
national and what ought to become all-European. Although European citizens credit the EU with 
Tsekeris, C., Demertzis, N., Inclusion of People in Decision-Making: The New Challenges
65
rities and experts should not further ignore or downplay a number of crucial overlap-
ping factors and underlying drivers that constantly and nonlinearly feed emergent 
perplexities and global disorder, reinforce social unrest, and dangerously destabilise 
the political scene all over Europe.10
2.1. Economic Insecurity
First, within the so-called “liquid modernity” (Bauman, 2000) and particularly with-
in the global financial crisis (now intensified by the novel coronavirus or COVID-19 
pandemic), populism and ethnocentric or xenophobic nationalism in the EU become 
highly attractive political options and have a growing nonlinear impact, especial-
ly on all those who desperately search for more secure and meaningful lives, suf-
fer from a strong sense of social deprivation and economic stagnation or economic 
decline (loss of income, loss of jobs, and loss of economic security), and feel that 
the political establishment is inefficient and has failed them (see e.g. Mounk, 2018; 
Mudde, 2017; Magni, 2017; Van Kessel, 2015; Eiermann et al., 2017; Muller, 2016; 
De Vries and Hoffmann, 2016).11
The Eurosceptic populist vote is on the rise in the EU, especially after “the 
2017 general elections in Austria, The Netherlands, France and Germany, and the 
2018 elections in the Czech Republic and Italy” (Meyer, 2018: 10). In the light of 
its capacity to sustain peace, they are still concerned that their needs are not met by the EU poli-
cies. See https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/19/europeans-credit-eu-with-promoting-peace-and-
prosperity-but-say-brussels-is-out-of-touch-with-its-citizens/ (accessed 2 April 2019).
10 Generally speaking, policy-making authorities and experts must not be arrogant and ignorant 
of the actual social reality and symbolic meaning-making processes, of how people perceive 
political agendas and construct needs and identities. Yet, political leadership should sometimes 
self-responsibly move forward to implement necessary projects of global prosperity and de-
mocracy, even though such projects are misperceived or disapproved by social majorities (mak-
ing however misperception or disapproval visible and explicit). For instance, the referendum 
in North Macedonia (and the referendum in the UK as well) shows us that people occasionally 
make decisions that are potentially harmful. Neither majority nor minority should be able to 
put their preferences above political stability, peace, and the rule of law. We thus need effective 
structures that can prevent excessive over-reach by both intransigent minorities and intransigent 
majorities. Yet, implementing political decisions must be inseparable from processes of under-
standing collective biases and misconceptions, as well as of maximising information dissemi-
nation, consciousness raising, transparency and ethical responsibility-taking. This implies pro-
found democratic changes in the complex European communication system as a whole. Above 
all, we need a multiscale (rather than an abstract universalist) interpretation of the political.
11 As Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk and Limor Gultchin (2017) rightly put it: “There are two 
distinct kinds of harms which the rise of populism is already creating: the first is in the realm of 
policy and threatens to harm the rights of minorities. The second is in the realm of institutions, 
and threatens to undermine the long-term stability of democracies across the continent.”
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the 26 May 2019 European Parliament election results, the authoritarian populist 
threat to democracy in Hungary, Poland, Italy, France, Spain and other parts of Eu-
rope remains almost the most significant headline. The far-right populist wave in-
deed continues, while an interesting debate about the content and character of the 
social democratic strategy is brewing.
European societies continue to create many outcasts. Excluded, marginal and 
neglected citizens (or the disaffected “precariat” or the “outsiders”) often cannot 
handle complexity and unpredictably react by voting for Eurosceptic or Europhobic 
protest candidates/movements and supporting radical, yet oversimplified and ina-
dequate, solutions to complicated or complex (long-standing) problems.12 Insecu-
rity and inequality, as observed in Ronald Inglehart’s most recent book on Cultural 
Evolution, are much likely to become even more severe as contemporary societies 
quickly “move into a mature phase of the Knowledge Society – that of Artificial In-
telligence Society” (Inglehart, 2018: 199).
This calls us to completely rethink the very conditions of democracy, some-
thing that is even more pressing for Europeans than Americans, according to the 
French historian, sociologist and political philosopher Marcel Gauchet (2017). It 
also calls for a new social contract between citizens and democratic leaderships, 
based on society’s historical achievements, such as fairness, inclusiveness and par-
ticipation, as well as freedom, diversity and resilience.
Such innovative political vision can arguably be further nourished and sup-
ported by a deep study and analysis of the fundamental laws of human complex 
systems, societal dynamics, and social behaviour and development (Katerelos and 
Tsekeris, 2012; Bednar and Page, 2016; Smith and Jenks, 2006).
2.2. Echo Chamber Society
Second, the triumphant advent of social media gave rise to  self-perpetual digital 
echo chambers (Sunstein, 2017; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Boutyline and Willer, 
2017) and filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011; Shafer and Doherty, 2017; Geschke, Lorenz 
and Holtz, 2018).  This allowed people to hear only the news, facts, opinions and 
stereotypes they want to hear, thus reducing the ability to handle or accommodate 
different perspectives, cultivating authoritarian notions of democracy (Welzel and 
Kirsch, 2017; Kirsch and Welzel, 2018; Kruse, Ravlik and Welzel, 2017), inciting 
12 Populists’ convenient (nostalgic) solution is to retreat to an allegedly simpler and better old 
world. However, this (idealised) world in practice does not exist anymore (Demertzis, 2020: 
155-156). Our strategic suggestion is not to erase complexity, but to try to promote understand-
ing and embrace uncertainty (rather than shy away from it), look forward and adapt democratic 
institutions, and learn how best to respond collectively to the multiple challenges posed by rapid 
global changes.
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hate and violence, and expanding the reach of reactionist, radical or fringe ideas and 
conspiracy theories (especially in harsh conditions of austerity and high socioeco-
nomic inequality).13 Such “heated”, toxic and fragmented bubble-like (digital) en-
vironment seems to implicitly and steadily amplify the so-called EU’s democratic 
deficit and, subsequently, deepen the crisis of legitimation within the Union.
The citizenry does not share a similar worldview anymore. Therefore, “grid-
lock and conflict become a very real possibility” (Nowak and Vallacher, 2018: 19). 
Social media users often behave as like-minded believers who tend to create the 
virtual equivalent of gated communities, and are seemingly extremely vulnerable 
to digital demagogy, propaganda, manipulation, and both intentional and acciden-
tal misinformation, or information disorders, something reinforced by the current 
planetary health crisis (COVID-19 pandemic).14 Different kinds of such “disorders” 
(pertaining to different levels of complexity) will obviously require different tacti-
cal responses.
In parallel, the valued profession of print journalism is gradually disappearing, 
thus “giving way to internet news sources on which it’s difficult to distinguish fake 
news from genuine news, weakening a crucial safeguard of democracy” (Inglehart, 
2018: 205).
In general, such negative developments, together with (neoliberal) globalisa-
tion, seriously destabilise the post-war foundations of liberal democracy and its 
collective principles and values.15 At the analytical level, yet, we need more data 
13 According to Marcel Gauchet (2017), we are still far from entirely understanding the full 
impact of the “libertarian” chaotic digital world, especially when it combines with large-scale 
societal and cultural transformations which it nonlinearly amplifies as it translates them into a 
radically different, horizontal mode of communication. The activist organisation and campaign 
group Avaaz recently showed that, all across Europe, far-right and anti-EU groups are system-
atically weaponising social media in order to spread white supremacist and false and hateful 
content to millions of internet users. See https://avaazimages.avaaz.org/Avaaz%20Report%20
Network%20Deception%2020190522.pdf (accessed 2 August 2019). The study resulted in an 
unprecedented shut down of Facebook pages just before voters head to the 26 May polls. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/22/far-right-facebook-groups-spreading-hate-
to-millions-in-europe (accessed 1 August 2019).
14 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinfor-
mation_en
15 Europeans indeed feel disaffected with the actual performance of democracy in their countries. 
In six of the ten European countries recently surveyed by Pew Research Center, half or more say 
they are dissatisfied with how democracy is actually working in their nation. See https://www.
pewglobal.org/2019/04/29/dissatisfaction-with-performance-of-democracy-is-common-in-ma-
ny-nations/ (accessed 4 August 2019). Still, this is less an expression of political cynicism than 
it is a demand of assertive citizens for more democracy along with emancipative values (Welzel 
and Moreno Alvarez, 2014).
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and more experiments, so that we can better understand how the vastly increased 
amount of social information actually re-shapes the highly contested, ambivalent, 
multifaceted and evolving European political public sphere (Margetts, 2017; Bail et 
al., 2018; Demertzis and Tsekeris, 2018). Access to such information pertains to a 
great power struggle for supremacy.
2.3. Cultural Backlash
Third, specific demographics seem to slowly revolt and seek revenge for the per-
ceived crisis of identity and the loss of continuity, consistency, certainty, predicta-
bility and control, the collapse of familiar “retro norms” and dominant collective 
narratives and ideologies, the questioning of old, received or traditional values, the 
accelerated pluralism, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and the uprooting of 
communities by the constant intensification of globalisation, fragmentation, and 
postmodern (or neoliberal) individualism (see Gerodimos, 2016; Inglehart and Nor-
ris, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).16 
This pertains to the so-called cultural backlash thesis, according to which “the 
surge in votes for populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phe-
nomenon but in large part as a reaction against progressive cultural change” (Ingle-
hart and Norris, 2016: 2-3). In other words, resentful political behaviours (Capelos 
and Demertzis, 2018; Capelos and Katsanidou, 2018) and the populist authoritarian 
vote are arguably caused by a widespread anxiety that pervasive cultural transfor-
mations and a constant influx of foreigners “are eroding the way of life one knew 
since childhood” (Inglehart, 2018: 181).
Understanding voters’ hidden incentives, motivations, values, emotions, and 
choices could substantially improve the democratic processes and their actual im-
plementation. In this regard, one of the most positive challenges for the EU public 
policy-makers is to further develop and utilise e-consultation, an inclusive and em-
powering democratic activity that is “intrinsically connected with the problem of 
extracting meaningful knowledge from citizens’ contributions. Online discussions 
and feedback contain valuable opinions about the effects of policy decisions and an 
essential knowledge about the societal needs that the policy tries to address” (Let-
tieri, 2016: 9; see also OECD, 2012).17
16 For details, see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (accessed 5 August 2019).
17 In addition, e-consultation, as part of deliberative digital democracy, may indeed be able to 
mitigate the multiple effects of some of the potential biases brought by policy professionals (see 
Banuri et al., 2019).
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2.4. Complex Reaction Patterns: Lessons from Dynamical Systems
Fourth, societies are complex adaptive systems (Helbing, 2012; Bednar and Page, 
2016; Urry, 2003) that usually tend to resist exogenous attempts to change them at 
large, from outside or in an arrogant, centralised top-down way, something known 
as Goodhart’s law (1975), or principle of Le Chatelier (1888), or as “illusion of 
control” (Makridakis and Taleb, 2009; Taleb and Blyth, 2011).18 Societal rigidity 
and unresponsiveness to (disruptive) change is also due to the implicit relational 
functioning of collective imaginaries (as shown in the abovementioned Macedo-
nia naming dispute), which can be described as historically produced and deeply 
rooted flowing networks of values and norms within each society (see Descombes, 
2016).19 These do have a considerably large and nonlinear dynamic impact on the 
path taken by the people and the system as a whole.
It is thus very difficult to impose symbolic identities, beliefs, mindsets or 
worldviews (let alone in a non-consensual, violent or authoritarian way) on self-or-
ganised communities, which are strongly driven by such radical imaginaries, espe-
cially in the turbulent era of identity politics. Instead, guided self-organisation is ab-
solutely preferable, that is, “to use, rather than fight, the system-immanent tendency 
of complex systems to self-organize and thereby create a stable, ordered state. For 
this, it is important to have the right kinds of interactions, adaptive feedback mecha-
nisms, and institutional settings” (Helbing, 2013: 54-55; see also Saperstein, 1986; 
Stacey et al., 2000).
In addition, implicit emotional, social and cognitive biases, as nudgers argue 
(e.g. Sunstein and Thaler, 2016), are powerful dynamic forces that mostly function 
as systemic “attractors” and heavily influence voters’ judgment and behaviour, po-
18 According to Dirk Helbing (2017: 315-316), top-down centralised control (social engineer-
ing) has three major flaws: “First, its micromanagement overwrites cultural cues, which have 
guided peoples’ decisions in the past. This interferes with the self-organization on lower levels 
of society (families, companies, non-profit organizations, etc.), and it may destroy the basis of 
social stability and order. Second, influencing peoples’ decisions locally narrows down the vari-
ance of choices, which undermines the ‘wisdom of the crowd effect’, leading to bad decision 
outcomes. Third, reducing socio-diversity and the pluralistic choice of goal functions is simi-
larly bad as losing bio-diversity. The economy and society should be understood like ecosystems 
with millions of interdependencies. Thus, if diversity is reduced, the economic development 
and success of a society are affected. This can lead to systemic malfunction, political instabi-
lity, collapse, and war.” Therefore, the strategic aim nowadays must arguably be to remodel and 
strengthen the elements of the system from the base, rather than taking classical top-down mea-
sures as in the past. In other words, a distributed, information-based management of the system 
is definitely more efficient and preferable.
19 Cf. the relational psychodynamic approach adopted by the political scientist John Dreijmanis 
(2018).
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tentially creating complex vulnerabilities (Ciampaglia and Menczer, 2018). Propa-
ganda experts know well that it takes much time, energy and strategy for people to 
change opinions, let alone values. As Inglehart (2018: 78) briefly puts it, “basic cul-
tural norms don’t change immediately”. Yet, societal conditions can unforeseeably 
create a bias that leads to reversals of majority opinion and to rapid and profound 
transformation (Nowak and Vallacher, 2018).
Most importantly, nonlinear dynamical systems always have a potential for bi-
furcation (i.e. the same set of factors can disproportionately trigger the emergence 
of qualitatively different behavioural outcomes) and sudden, unanticipated changes 
(Kelso, 1997; Arnold et al., 1999).20 As Catastrophe Theory describes, “all good 
things are more fragile than bad things. Stability is more fragile than instability” 
(Esposito, 2012: 55; Guastello, 2013). Accordingly, integration is more fragile than 
disintegration. Much more interestingly, the scientific and quantitative analysis of 
the persistent question of stability of democracy is nowadays “possible and, indeed, 
necessary. It requires a concerted effort across the mathematical, natural and social 
sciences. In particular, the insights and tools from complexity science deserve more 
attention in this endeavor” (Wiesner et al., 2018: 15).
Conclusions
Given the recent example case of the Macedonia naming dispute, it can be con-
cluded that it is rather sensible that EU policy-making needs to concurrently elabo-
rate on both reasonable geopolitical interests and actual sociopolitical realities and 
symbolic identities. Especially in the wake of the so-called Globalisation 4.0 and 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Baldwin, 2019; Pezzuto, 2019; Schwab, 2016; 
Schäfer, 2018; Floridi, 2014; Tsekeris, 2018, 2019),21 it seems that EU’s existing 
policy designs and instruments have to be properly informed and updated in order 
to provide more sustainable outcomes. European economy and society are complex 
ecologies which are facing on-going systemic changes and acute new problems 
that should be addressed collectively and insightfully for the sake of the European 
20 More generally, we arguably need to better understand and apply the complexity notions of 
“tail risk” and “fat tailedness” (random variables in the system can produce multiplicative ef-
fects) in the real-world social interaction and politics (see Taleb, 2012, 2016).
21 See also http://time.com/collection/davos-2019/ (accessed 11 August 2019). On 19 April 2016, 
the European Commission, under the responsibility of Commissioner Oettinger, launched an am-
bitious strategy on digitising the European industry. Mariya Gabriel, as current Commissioner for 
Digital Economy and Society, is now responsible for its systematic implementation (to support the 
shift toward Industry 4.0). This pertains to the first industry-related initiative of the Digital Single 
Market package, aimed to accelerate responsible and sustainable innovation, to boost producti-
vity and growth, and to improve EU citizens’ living standards and job opportunities. See https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en (accessed 3 August 2019).
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project – a project in constant need of updating and re-enchantment. Serious know-
ledge gaps, deficits and weaknesses of our current theoretical understanding, as 
well as short-sighted autopoietic bureaucratic subsystems, substantially impede us 
from making big steps forward.
Despite the plethora of difficulties and the broad-based feeling of sailing in un-
charted waters, the EU policy-making experts and political elites urgently need to 
re-understand, re-theorise and re-codify multiple and complex deep processes, or 
hidden dynamic patterns (avoiding false dualisms22), in order to build new positive 
narratives and effectively grasp and confront emerging political developments in-
side and outside the Union. The latter are often manifested as public grievances and 
dissatisfaction, distrust and mistrust, moral and social intolerance, anti-immigration 
demands, anti-establishment and anti-elitist sentiment, anti-expert scepticism, cul-
tural authoritarianism, and mass support for populist anti-system parties.
All in all, facing up and tackling these adverse nonlinear (as opposed to in-
cremental and linear) developments necessarily requires from the EU democratic 
system as a whole to proactively and sustainably overcome the very real shortcom-
ings that have systematically fuelled them, also emphasising what unites rather than 
what divides European societies. We can thus steer Europe towards a new era of 
shared prosperity and well-being.
For this urgent task, however, we do need to combine dedicated leadership and 
long-termist policy design with new scientific (interdisciplinary) advancements and 
innovative approaches, such as the complex dynamical systems approach,23 to gain 
a more adequate (relational) comprehension and management of contemporary so-
cial, cultural and political processes. This eventually points to the crucial need for 
epistemological cautiousness and ontological boldness, as well as for skillful, com-
petent and complexity-minded social and political scientists.
22 “Contrary to popular narratives, the choice we face is not between openness and protection-
ism, technology and jobs, immigration and national identity, or economic growth and social 
equity. These are false dichotomies; but their prominence in contemporary political discourse 
illustrates how underprepared we are for Globalization 4.0. [...] We should not wait for another 
crisis to provide the impetus for adapting governance to a changing world. There are already nu-
merous opportunities for deeper cooperative engagement among stakeholders at all levels. What 
we need now is a renewed commitment from government, business, and civil society leaders to 
engage in collective dialogue about our shared challenges.”
23 Of course, such “innovative approaches” include, except from the “meta-sciences” of chaos, 
complexity, nonlinearity and networks, converging radical technological developments, such as 
blockchain technology, big data analytics, cloud and quantum computing, cyber physical systems, 
real and virtual multiprocessors, the Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Everything (IoE), Inter-
net of Nano Things (IoNT), Internet of Bio-Nano Things (IoBNT) and Internet of Multimedia-
Nano Things (IoMNT), which rapidly lead to the so-called Post-Internet Society (Mosco, 2017).
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